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STATE JURISDICTION TO TAX INDIAN
RESERVATION LAND AND ACTIVITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice John Marshall once stated that "the power to tax in-
volves the power to destroy."' Considering our nation's long-standing
policy of preserving Indian reservation land and fostering Indian eco-
nomic development,2 it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has
found Indian reservation land and activities exempt from state taxa-
tion.3 Since the turn of the century, the Court has held that American
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819).
2. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 450a(b) (1988) (stating a congressional commitment to establishing a "meaningful In-
dian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly transition from the Federal
domination of programs for, and services to Indians to effective and meaningful partici-
pation by Indian people"); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988) (de-
claring a congressional policy to provide capital to encourage Indians to develop and
utilize their physical and human resources and raise their standard of living); Presi-
dent's Statement on Indian Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 98 (Jan. 24, 1983)
(stating that the Reagan Administration intended to remove obstacles to Indian self-
government and encourage development of healthy economies on the reservations).
3. American Indians are not exempt from federal income tax. See Superintendent
of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418, 419-20 (1935) (holding that
income on funds held in trust for Indians was subject to federal income tax). Congress,
however, has elected not to tax some kinds of income. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 203-04 (2d ed. 1988) (noting which income is
not subject to taxation). This Note is concerned only with state taxation of American
Indians and will not discuss federal taxation. For developments in the field of federal
taxation, see generally id. at 203-05; FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL IN-
DIAN LAW 265-66 (Five Rings Press 1986) (1942).
In order to adequately discuss state taxation, some history on state jurisdiction over
matters other than taxation is necessary. However, the author has included this discus-
sion only as a background to the study of state taxation. The scope of this Note is
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Indians are immune from various types of state taxes.
In time, because of beliefs that Indians held an unfair advantage in
the market,' the Court ameliorated the protection traditionally offered
to Indian tribes.6 The Court developed a series of rules governing
when states could impose taxes on tribal activities.7 Over the past fif-
teen years, however, the Court has abandoned the tests and has not
replaced them with a coherent rule.' This indecision has contributed
limited to state taxation and not other exercises of jurisdiction, such as criminal or civil
jurisdiction.
Taxation by local governmental bodies involves the same issues as state taxation.
Therefore, despite the fact that this Note speaks only of taxation by the state, the con-
clusions drawn are equally applicable in the context of taxes imposed by lower-level
governments.
4. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903) (holding Indians exempt from
state taxes on lands held in trust for the Indians, permanent improvements on lands
held in trust, and personal property purchased with United States money for the use
and benefit of the Indians). See also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202, 215 n.17 (1987) ("ETihe federal tradition of Indian immunity from state
taxation is very strong and.., the state interest in taxation is correspondingly weak.").
5. See, e.g., Steve Dwyer, Kansas Marketers Face Taxing Ordeal with Indian Reser-
vation, NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS, Feb. 1991, at 17 (describing success of three non-
Indians who operate gas stations on reservations and are therefore exempt from state
tax); John Edwards, Reservations Lure Commercial Deals, ARIZ. Bus. GAZETTE, Aug.
2, 1990, at 1 (explaining the attraction of Indian reservations to Real Estate developers);
Estelle Lander & John McDonald, Tax-Exempt Cigarettes Draw Fire, NEWSDAY, Dec.
20, 1991, at 3 (describing impact on non-Indian merchants of tax exempt cigarette sales
within reservation in New York).
6. "The Burger Court has abandoned the traditional zealous protection that the
Supreme Court had historically shown for the authority of Indian governments over
their reservations." Robert N. Clinton, State Power over Indian Reservations: A Critical
Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D. L. REV. 434, 445 (1981). The Rehnquist
Court seems to be continuing this trend. See County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian
Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992) (approving state imposition of ad valorem tax on land
patented in fee under the Indian General Allotment Act).
7. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)
(announcing the preemption test and limiting the Indian sovereignty doctrine to "a
backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read"); Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (using an infringement on sovereignty test and
holding that the state court should have dismissed a suit by a non-Indian, who operated
a store on an Indian reservation, against an Indian customer because "to allow the
exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts
over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of Indians to govern
themselves").
8. See Clinton, supra note 6, at 439-40 (arguing that the Burger Court has abol-
ished any analytical framework without providing any replacement rationale, "leaving
in their wake a turbulent backwater of confusing decisions that necessarily engender not
only further litigation but on-going tensions between the states and the Indian tribes").
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to growing tensions in some parts of the country between American
Indians and the states and their tax-paying citizens.9
This Note outlines the history of the Supreme Court's inconsistent
approach to the issue of taxing Indians. It then discusses Congress'
role in providing tax immunity to the Indians, and the problems en-
countered with taxation and without taxation. Finally, this Note advo-
cates that the Court adopt a "modernized" preemption analysis to deal
with questions regarding the state's ability to impose taxes on Indian
reservation land and activities.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH
A. Case Law Before 1970
Our nation has long afforded American Indian tribes freedom from
state jurisdiction and control.1" After gaining independence, the fed-
eral government feared that the states and individual citizens would
deal unfairly with the Indian tribes and, consequently, foster wars with
the Indians. 1 Therefore, the federal government assumed exclusive
control over relations with the tribes.12 The Commerce Clause and the
treaty-making power of the Constitution are sources of federal author-
ity to control Indian matters. 13
During the first decades of United States independence, the status of
9. Such tensions are the result of many factors. Professor Paul J. Hartman has
concluded that:
The on-reservation taxation conflicts between American Indians and the States
have not declined in recent years. Sociological, political and economic factors have
contributed to the conflict. Sociologically, it has been said that there is a general
"lack of understanding by both whites and Indians of one another's cultural differ-
ences" . . . The States perpetually seek additional sources of revenue while the need
of Indian tribes for economic aid is palpable and critical.
PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 239-40
(Supp. 1990) [hereinafter HARTMAN SUPPLEMENT] (quoting Clifford M. Lytle, The
Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Continuing Problems of State Encroachment
into Indian Country, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 65, 72 (1980)).
For insight on the various positions involved with respect to taxing an Indian reserva-
tion, see Pat Doyle, Lean-budget Counties Cast Property-tax Eye on Indian Band Casi-
nos, STAR TRIBUNE, Sept. 19, 1992, at IA.
10. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945) ("The policy of leaving Indians free
from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.").
11. See William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today,
62 WASH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1987).
12. Id.
13. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to "regulate
Commerce with the Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and that the President
1993]
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Indian nations was unclear and caused dissention between Indian and
non-Indian communities.14 In 1823, the Supreme Court made the first
serious attempt to define the rights of Indians. In Johnson v. McIn-
tosh," the Court proffered a theory of Indian subservience to the fed-
eral government.16 The Court explained that conquest gave the United
States ownership and title to the land, but this title was subject to the
continued use and occupancy of the land by the Indians. 17
The Court expanded its theory of Indian dependency in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia.i" In holding that an Indian tribe was not a foreign
state for purposes of invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 9 Chief Justice Marshall described the tribes as "domestic, de-
pendent nations."20 Although only one other Justice joined Marshall's
opinion, four of the six Justices on the Court found that tribes pos-
sessed some amount of sovereignty. 2 '
One year later, the Court in Worchester v. Georgia 22 reversed the
conviction of a non-Indian accused of entering Cherokee territory
without a state mandated license.2" The Court identified an Indian na-
tion as a distinct political community and held that, absent congres-
shall have the power "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
treaties." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
14. See Clifford M. Lytle, The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Continuing
Problems of State Encroachment into Indian Country, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65 (1980)
(describing the role the United States Supreme Court has played in protecting Indian
nations against state attempts to intrude on tribal sovereignty).
15. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
16. Lytle, supra note 14, at 66.
17. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591 ("[Ihe Indians are to be regarded merely as occupants,
to be protected ... while in possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of
transferring the absolute title to others.").
18. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
19. The Cherokees challenged any attempt by the state of Georgia to extend state
law into Indian territory. Id. at 2. In order to invoke original jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court, the tribe needed to be considered a "foreign state" under Article III,
§ 2 of the United States Constitution. Id. at 15. While the Court agreed that the tribe
was a state, it held that the tribe was not a "foreign state." Idl at 15, 19.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Lytle, supra note 14, at 69. Justices Marshall and MacLean held that tribes
were "domestic, dependent nations," which means that they possess only limited sover-
eignty. Justices Thompson and Story found that tribes were sovereign nations. In dis-
sent, Justices Baldwin and Johnson determined that tribes have no sovereignty.
22. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
23. Id. at 562.
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sional approval, Georgia law had no force on Indian territory.24
Because the tribes were essentially "sovereigns," only the federal gov-
ernment controlled relations with the Indians.25 Thus, Worchester
firmly established the principle that within Indian territory, states have
no power, not even over non-Indians.26
In addition to granting Indian tribes immunity from state jurisdic-
tion unless explicitly authorized by Congress, the Supreme Court also
developed a "canon of construction" for interpreting congressional leg-
islation. In determining whether an act of Congress is an explicit au-
thorization permitting states to assert jurisdiction over the Indian
tribes, the legislation is to be construed liberally.27 Courts are to re-
solve ambiguities in favor of the Indians. 28 By proscribing state inter-
ference in Indian affairs without express congressional authorization,
and by adopting a strict canon of construction for interpreting such
statutes, the Supreme Court afforded the Indian nations great protec-
tion from state taxation.29 Such absolute protection, however, did not
last long.
24. The Court reasoned:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by
our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.
Id. at 560-61.
25. See Canby, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that "Worchester leaves little question
that in Marshall's view, the tribes were inherently empowered to govern everything that
happened within their territories").
26. Accord The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867) (rejecting state efforts
to impose a land tax on reservation property).
27. Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). See also Mon-
tana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
28. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1930) (finding that, while in general
tax exemptions are to be strictly construed, they should be liberally construed for tax
exemptions secured by Indians in agreements with the national government). See also
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
At least one commentator believed that the courts had begun a trend of according
less deference to this canon of construction. See Canby, supra note 11, at 19. However,
recent cases indicate that this doctrine is as strong as ever. See, eg., County of Yakima
v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 693 (1992); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 177 (1989); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759,
766 (1985).
29. But see Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (holding that the Territory of
Oklahoma could impose a tax on the cattle of non-Indian lessees of reservation land).
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The Court slowly realized that, in certain circumstances, the states
needed to exercise jurisdiction over Indian territory. In United States
v. McBratney3 ° and Draper v. United States,31 the Court held that
states have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians when they commit
crimes against other non-Indians on reservation territory.32 These
cases initiated a shift in the earlier philosophy of Indian protection-
ism. 33 No longer did the Court restrict states from asserting jurisdic-
tion absent congressional authorization. Courts recognized that states
retained some jurisdiction over Indian territory.
In the often cited, but seldom followed, case of Goudy v. Meath,3
the Court swung to the other side of the pendulum. In Goudy, the
Court upheld a Washington State Supreme Court decision subjecting
an Indian who had been allotted land pursuant to the Indian General
Allotment Act of 188735 to the same taxes that other state citizens
paid.36 The Court reasoned that once Indians are issued patents in fee
to areas of land, they become citizens entitled to all the rights and priv-
ileges of the state.37 Absent a specific statutory exemption, Indians
who have the benefit of the law must be subject to state jurisdiction as
well.38 One set of laws to which they become subject is the tax laws.39
30. 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
31. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
32. Draper, 164 U.S. at 247; McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624. See also New York ex rel.
Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946) (same).
33. See Canby, supra note 11, at 4-5 (noting the significance of the Court's decisions
in McBratney and Draper).
34. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
35. According to § 348 of the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-358 (1988 and Supp. 11 1990), reservation land was to be held in trust for the
Indians for 25 years. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988). After this period of time, the Secretary of
the Interior was to allot the land in fee to individual Indians or the tribe itself. Id. At
this point, the land was freely alienable.
For a more thorough examination of this Act and other Acts dealing with Indian
reservation land, see infra section III-A of this Note.
36. 203 U.S. at 149.
37. Id. Despite having the benefit of many state laws, some state protections neces-
sarily do not cover or only minimally cover reservation property such as police protec-
tion and nearby medical facilities.
38. "Indians to whom allotments have been made shall have the benefit of and be
subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may
reside." Id (quoting Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905)).
39. Id. In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), Cotton
Petroleum Corporation protested state severance taxation of oil and gas it produced on
land leased from the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. Id. at 168-70. The corporation argued that
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Goudy represented the Court's experimentation on the other side of
the spectrum--subjecting an Indian allottee to all state taxes. After
trying both extremes, the Court realized that it had to develop a consis-
tent rule that would protect the Indians from excessive state interfer-
ence, but would also guarantee to the state a certain amount of control
over reservation activities. The Court thus embarked on a series of
tests to meet these goals.
The first test with which the Court experimented was the "federal
instrumentality" test.' ° This test was based upon the federal govern-
ment's exemption from state taxation. Because Indian tribes were "in-
strumentalities" of the federal government, they too were exempt from
state taxation.4 1 This test was comprehensive and highly protective of
Indians. It suggested a partial return to the status of granting Indians
absolute immunity from state taxation absent congressional
authorization.
One of the first cases in which the Court used the federal instrumen-
tality approach was United States v. Rickert.42 In Rickert, the Court
held three separate state taxes invalid as applied to Indian tribes.4 3
First, the Court found that a state tax on reservation land held in trust
for the Indians by the United States was not taxable because this land
the state's taxes far exceeded the benefits that the state conferred on the reservation and,
therefore, violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 170.
The tribe filed a brief amicus curiae arguing that state taxation interfered with the
tribe's ability to raise its own taxes and made leasing on reservation oil and gas leases
less desirable. Id. The tribe also argued that the state did not provide services commen-
surate with its taxes. Id. The majority of the Court held that state taxes were not
limited by the amount of benefits conferred. Id. at 185. Thus, even if tribes receive
limited services from the state, they may be taxed at any amount, so long as the tax is
not discriminatory.
40. See Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922) (applying the intergovernmen-
tal immunity doctrine to prohibit state taxation of a non-Indian lessee's income derived
from the sale of his interest in oil produced on Indian land), overruled by Helvering v.
Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 386-87 (1938) (holding that private parties
are not exempt from federal tax on income derived from operations under contract or
lease with state merely because taxation will have an indirect or remote effect on the
tribe). See also Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609 (1926) (denying state the
power to apply a tax on ore extracted by non-Indian mining company which leased
mineral rights from Indian land); PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 6:10 (1981) (analyzing the concept of federal instru-
mentalities as a basis for Indian freedom from state taxation).
41. See Gillespie, 257 U.S. at 504 (finding lessee to be an instrumentality of the
government and therefore non-taxable).
42. 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
43. Id. at 435-44.
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
106 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 44:99
was an instrumentality of the federal government.' Second, the Court
ruled that a tax on permanent improvements to the land was invalid
because these improvements were "part of the land."4 Furthermore,
the Court held that the state could not tax the personal property of the
Indians because that property had been purchased with government
money and belonged to the government, though purchased for the use
and benefit of the Indians.46 This case exemplifies the comprehensive-
ness of the federal instrumentality test. Not surprisingly, the test did
not last.47
The Court realized that it had to give states some jurisdiction over
Indian territory. In 1959, the Court adopted the "infringement on sov-
ereignty" test.48 In Williams v. Lee,49 the Supreme Court held that a
state court erred in not granting a motion for dismissal when a non-
Indian, who operated a business on a tribal reservation, sued an Indian
for collection of a debt.50 The Court ruled that only the tribal court
had jurisdiction to hear the case.5 State jurisdiction in this situation,
the Court reasoned, would infringe upon the Indians' right to govern
themselves.52 This new test suggested that whenever tribal interests
44. Id. at 437. The court explained that just as federally-owned land is exempt
from state taxation, that land which the federal government held in trust for the Indian
tribes was likewise exempt. Id at 438-39.
45. Id. at 442.
46. Id. at 443-44.
47. In Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949), instead of using
the instrumentality test, the Court equated Indian tribes with independent contractors
performing work for the federal government. Id. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 150 (1973) (noting the demise of the intergovernmental-immunity
doctrine in Indian cases).
48. The Court never referred to this test as the "infringement on sovereignty" test.
This nomenclature is exclusively for academic purposes. See infra note 60 explaining
other references used by this author.
49. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
50. Id. at 223.
51. Id.
52. Id. While stressing that the non-Indian litigant was "on the Reservation,"
which would have provided tribal jurisdiction under a territory-oriented Worchester
test, the Williams court seemed most concerned that state jurisdiction would infringe on
the tribe's right to "govern themselves." Id. Likewise, the Court has held that an In-
dian tribe, as an entity, cannot be sued unless Congress or the tribe clearly waived
immunity. See also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of the Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma, 111 S. Ct. 905, 909 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
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were affected, the state could not assert jurisdiction.53
The Court in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission 
54
also applied a test that considered the effects of taxation on tribal inter-
ests. In this case, the state attempted to impose a two percent tax on
the gross income of a trading post that was federally licensed to do
business with Indians on the reservation. 5 The Court held that such a
tax would frustrate Congress' intent to protect the Indians and to
maintain exclusive control over trading with Indians. 6 The tax was
therefore declared invalid.5 7 The test, as applied, drew a distinction
between on-reservation activities and off-reservation activities.58 Be-
cause on-reservation activities presumptively infringed upon the Indi-
ans' right to govern themselves more than off-reservation activities,
state authority over Indians was more extensive over activities not on
the reservation. 9 Although this test gave more authority to the states
than the "federal instrumentality" test as well, the Court soon aban-
doned the "infringement on sovereignty" test. The Burger Court fol-
lowed by introducing more tests.
B. Case Law: The Burger Court
The Burger Court experimented with different approaches to the is-
sue of state taxation over Indian reservation land and activities. The
53. "[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them." Williams, 358 U.S. at 219. "When tribal interests, broadly viewed,
were affected, the state was excluded." Canby, supra note 11, at 6.
A trivial economic impact will not necessarily be sufficient to defeat the tax. See, eg.,
Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding
that a state possessory interest tax as applied to lessees of Indian land was indirect and
did not threaten tribal self-government and was therefore properly imposed), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). See also CANBY, supra note 3, at 209-14 (outlining state
power to tax non-Indians within Indian territory).
54. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
55. Id. at 686. Petitioners only challenged the tax as applied to sales to reservation
Indians. Id. at 686 n. 1.
56. The Court noted that the federal statutes and regulations authorizing the trad-
ing post to do business on the reservation indicated a congressional intent to occupy the
field and bar state taxes. Id. at 690.
57. Id. at 691-92. Cf. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898) (noting that the
impact of imposing an Oklahoma territorial tax on the cattle of non-Indian lessees of
reservation land was too remote to be deemed tax on the lands or privileges of the
Indians themselves).
58. 380 U.S. at 69 n.14.
59. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
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Court utilized several tests, but within any single opinion these tests
were intermingled. The fact that the Court seldom articulated the tests
it used contributed to the uncertain nature of the Court's analysis.
This led to inconsistent holdings and left the states and tribes without a
standard by which to model their conduct. The various tests employed
by the Burger Court included the "preemption" test, the "territorial"
test, and the "traditional function" test.6°
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission61 marked the shift
from the Williams "infringement on sovereignty" test to preemption
analysis. 62 In McClanahan, Arizona sought to impose a personal in-
come tax on an Indian who derived his income solely from reservation
sources.63 The state argued that an individual income tax did not in-
terfere with tribal self-government, and it was therefore permissible
under Williams.6 The Court held that the Williams test was not
meant to apply in this situation because Williams only concerned situa-
tions involving non-Indians.65 The Court determined that exemption
from tax laws should, as a general rule, be clearly expressed, and any
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the Indians.66 In this case,
Congress manifested a sufficiently clear expression of intent to render
the Indians immune from personal income taxes.67 Preemption analy-
sis, although used inconsistently, is still the basis for many of the
60. The names of the tests-the "territorial" test and the "traditional function" test,
as well as the earlier noted "infringement on sovereignty" test, are not found in the
literature. They are simply names coined by the author of this Note to help understand
the analysis of the Court. The Court has never named the tests it has used, partly
because of the ad hoc way in which the Court utilizes these tests.
61. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
62. McClanahan did not reject the Williams test, but merely reduced sovereignty to
a "backdrop" against which preemption analysis would focus. Id. at 169. The author
of this Note is unconvinced that, in practice, this distinction carries any meaning. See
supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text for discussion of the Williams test.
63. 411 U.S. at 169.
64. Id. at 179.
65. Id. The Court reasoned that both the state and the tribe had an interest in
asserting jurisdiction when a non-Indian was on reservation property and that the Wil-
liams test was designed to resolve such disputes between competing interests. Id.
Courts still use different tests depending upon whom the state is taxing. See, e.g., Sac
and Fox Nation v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 967 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1992) (distin-
guishing between taxes on tribal members and taxes on nonmembers).
66. 411 U.S. at 174-76. The opinion suggests that express congressional authoriza-
tion is needed for applying taxes to the Indians in the first place. See id. at 170-71, 174,
176.
67. Id. at 173, 180, 181. The Court found implied intent not to subject Indians to
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Court's decisions.6"
The same day that the Court introduced the preemption analysis in
McClanahan, it also utilized a new "territorial" test in Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones.6 9 In Mescalero, an Indian tribe was operating a
ski resort off the reservation.70 The state sought to impose a sales and
use tax on the ski lifts built by the Indians.71 Section 5 of the Indian
Reorganization Act72 exempted land and rights in land if acquired in
trust for the Indians. Liberally reading this provision, the Court deter-
mined that the land fell under Section 5.73 Therefore, the Court de-
cided that because the ski lifts were permanent improvements, a use tax
on the ski lifts was a tax on part of the land and hence invalid as ap-
plied to the Indians.74 Although Section 5 exempted land from taxes,
the Court held that the section did not foreclose state taxation of in-
come derived from the land.7 5 The Burger Court noted that, unless
Congress specifically exempts them, Indians are generally subject to all
state taxes when they travel outside reservation boundaries. 7 6 Con-
taxation by considering many congressional provisions, including the Arizona Enabling
Act and the Buck Act. Id. at 174-78.
68. See, ag., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (holding
that oil and gas production on Indian reservations by non-Indian lessees may be subject
to non-discriminatory state taxation unless Congress has expressly or impliedly acted to
preempt such taxes).
69. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
70. Id. at 146.
71. Id. at 146-47.
72. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1988). For a more thorough examination of this Act and its
consequences, see infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
73. 411 U.S. at 155. Technically, the land for the ski resort was not "acquired in
trust" for the tribe. The United States already owned the land. Therefore, it would
have been meaningless for the United States to convey the land to itself in trust for the
tribe. Instead, the United States leased the land to the tribe. Due to the circumstances,
the Court determined that there was no meaningful distinction which would justify
excluding this land from § 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act. The Court therefore
treated this property as if it were acquired in trust for the use of the tribe. Id. at 155
n.ll.
74. Id. at 158.
75. Id. at 157-58.
76. "Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation
boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise
applicable to all citizens of the State." Id. at 148-49. See also Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962) ("State authority over Indians is yet more exten-
sive over activities.., not on any reservation. It has never been doubted that states may
punish crimes committed by Indians, even reservation Indians, outside of Indian coun-
try."); CANBY, supra note 3, at 209 ("Outside of Indian country, every Indian is subject
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versely, reservation land and on-reservation activities were not taxable
absent explicit authorization from Congress." This reasoning, in es-
sence, constitutes the "territorial" test. Generally, off-reservation land
and activities are presumptively taxable, whereas on-reservation land
and activities are presumptively nontaxable, and Congress can, with
explicit language, defeat either presumption. 78
to state jurisdiction and if he or she earns an income or engages in other taxable activity
there, the state can impose its tax.").
77. Although it can be considered mere dicta, the most frequently quoted passage
from Mescalero reads:
[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal
statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries
of the reservation, and McClanahan ... lays to rest any doubt in this respect by
holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent.
411 U.S. at 148. The opinion cites McClanahan approvingly. In McClanahan,
although holding that a state could tax unless preempted by congressional intent, the
Court also provided language suggesting that "taxation is not permissible absent con-
gressional consent." Id. (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164). The fact that Mescalero
was decided on the same day as McClanahan further confuses attempts to interpret the
Court's approach. The Court's inconsistency stifled the search for a universal standard.
The Mescalero decision, in any event, was consistent with the views of the executive
branch:
State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation
except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply. It fol-
lows that Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to
State taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred upon the State by act
of Congress.
U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 845 (1958). Now that some
state laws are applicable to tribal Indians, perhaps the Department of the Interior will
follow a different approach.
78. Justice Douglas, writing for the dissent in Mescalero, argued that the distinction
between acts on-reservation and off-reservation was improper. 411 U.S. at 160-61
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Justices Brennan and Stewart joined in Douglas' opin-
ion.
According to this "territorial" test, an Indian who leaves reservation property is sub-
ject to state law. However, a non-Indian does not escape state law when entering reser-
vation land. Therefore, a person's presence on reservation land is not the only
controlling factor.
The "territorial" test encounters difficulty when applied to motor vehicle use taxes.
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980), the Court held that a state could not impose such taxes on vehicles used only on
reservation property, even if sometimes used outside the reservation. Id. at 162 n.29,
163. But determining exactly how much off-reservation use enables the state to impose
these taxes is inevitably an arbitrary choice.
The territorial test is not yet dead. See Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d
1536 (5th Cir. 1992) (approving the imposition of a retail sales tax on off-reservation
purchases by tribal members).
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The Burger Court entertained yet another test in Rice v. Rehner.7 9
In this case, California required an Indian trader to procure a state
license before she sold liquor for off-premises consumption. 0 The
Court determined that because liquor regulation was not a traditional
function of tribal self-government, the state could validly impose its
regulations.8 ' This new test posed the question of whether this particu-
lar regulation had traditionally been under Indian control.8 2 The three
dissenting Justices argued, however, that a "modernized" preemption
analysis should apply. 3 Moreover, they argued that the majority's
test, contrary to federal policy, discourages Indians from undertaking
new enterprises in an effort to become self-supporting. The Court has
not used the "traditional function" test since its inception in Rice.
Two other tests have been suggested but never adopted by a majority
of the Court. The first is a simple balancing test. According to this
proposal, the Court would weigh the respective interests of the state,
the tribe, and the federal government and determine which interests
outweighed the others.8 4 This approach was recently rejected in favor
79. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
80. Id. at 715-16.
81. Id. at 724-25. Although the court only applied this test in the context of liquor
regulation, the rationale applies equally in other contexts. Canby, supra note 11, at 19.
Another rationale used by the Court stated that 18 U.S.C. § 1161, which provides
that liquor transactions are not subject to prohibition under federal law, authorized
such regulation. Respondent Rehner argued that this provision preempted state regula-
tion. The Court found, however, that Congress meant to leave the decision to the
states. 463 U.S. at 733-35.
82. This new test can be considered an extension of the "infringement of sover-
eignty" test employed in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See supra notes 48-53
for discussion of the "infringement of sovereignty" test.
83. 463 U.S. at 738-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined in the dissent. See infra notes 205-13 for an in-depth description of "modem-
ized" preemption analysis.
84. Several sources have proposed that modem preemption analysis involves this
sort of balancing. See, eg., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334
(1983) ("State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or
is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority."); Canby, supra
note 11, at 12-13 (discussing the Court's use of the balancing approach). But the very
act of balancing acknowledges that both the state and the tribe have legitimate interests
warranting protection. Canby, supra note 11, at 14. This is inconsistent with the prin-
ciples behind the preemption test. See County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 683, 692-93 (1992) (refuting the lower court's finding that the tribe had a protect-
able interest against imposition of a tax).
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of seeking congressional intent.8 5 The other suggested test was first
proposed by Justice Marshall in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker.86 Under Justice Marshall's test, a state tax on Indian reserva-
tion land or activities is considered valid unless (1) congressional legis-
lation explicitly preempts the tax, or (2) the tax would interfere with
the tribe's ability to govern itself.87 This two-factor test incorporates
the McClanahan preemption test with the Williams "infringement on
sovereignty" test. Either barrier would be sufficient to prohibit state
encroachment. 88
The intermingling of the different tests has caused much confusion.
Nonetheless, several common factors have consistently influenced the
Court's decisions in this area. These factors do not amount to a test,
but they form the basis for much of the rationale used by the Court.
There are three major factors which have influenced the Court on mul-
tiple occasions.89
The first factor, which influenced particularly the "infringement on
sovereignty" test, considers a tribe's ability to impose its own taxes.
Because tribes retain some sovereign power, the Court has held that
they can justifiably impose their own taxes." However, the tribes were
85. County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 693 ("Either Con-
gress intended to pre-empt the state taxing authority or it did not. Balancing of inter-
ests is not the appropriate gauge for determining validity since it is that very balancing
which we have reserved to Congress.").
86. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
87. IH. at 142-43.
88. IaL at 143.
89. These three factors-tribal taxation, Indians who are not members of the gov-
erning tribe, and the checkerboard pattern-have been consistently employed. Many
factors have influenced individual decisions in this area, but these three have seemingly
been determinative in and of themselves in several situations. Additionally, these three
factors have been repeated in a multitude of decisions in this area. See infra notes 90-98
and accompanying text describing each factor and providing illustrative cases.
90. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (allowing
tribe to impose tax on value of leasehold interests in tribal land without receiving ap-
proval from the Secretary of the Interior); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130 (1982) (holding that tribes have inherent power, absent federal divestment, to im-
pose a tax on oil and gas production on tribal land); Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (rejecting state's contention
that tribes lack the power to impose cigarette taxes on non-tribal purchasers).
The tribe's power to tax derives from their power to exclude non-Indians and "from
the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its juris-
diction and to defray the cost of providing governmental services .... " Merrion, 455
U.S. at 137.
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still dependent upon the United States and could not perform functions
inherently inconsistent with this dependent status.91 Thus, for exam-
ple, the tribe had no authority over reservation land when that land
was held in fee by non-Indians.92 Problems arose when a state wanted
to impose a tax in addition to a tribal tax. The Court held that the
tribe's power to tax did not oust the state's power, for there could be
concurrent jurisdiction to tax." This put tribal members at a disad-
91. See, eg., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (denying tribe
authority to regulate fishing and hunting by non-members of the tribe on land not
owned by the tribe). See generally Canby, supra note 11, at 15-16 (describing the limits
on tribal power due to their dependent status). Tribes may exercise broad civil jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians on Indian reservation lands. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 139; Washing-
ton, 447 U.S. at 152-53. However, unlike other governmental entities, the tribe's ability
to tax non-Indians is subject to constraints. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141. The Secretary of
the Interior must approve any taxes applied to non-members of the tribe, and Congress
can take away the tribe's authority to tax altogether. Id.
The Court has held that a tribe's regulation of relations with non-members of the
tribe is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status. See Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 427 (1989) (citing United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)). "It defies common sense to suppose that
Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become sub-
ject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ulti-
mate destruction of tribal government." Montana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9. The purpose of
the allotment policy was the incorporation of Indians into civilized society, thus eventu-
ally taking away their autonomy. See infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text for
discussion of congressional allotment policy.
92. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425. Likewise, an Indian tribe could not regulate non-
Indians unless Congress explicitly gave them this authority. Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Tribes could regulate, however, the activities of non-
Indians who entered consensual relationships with the tribe or its members. Montana,
450 U.S. at 565; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
The Montana Court held that Indians could regulate the activities of non-members
within the reservation only when (1) the non-member entered a consensual relationship
with the tribe, or (2) the "conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 450 U.S. at 565-
66. See also Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428. In Brendale, the Court ruled that, in addition to
threatening "the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe," the threat must be "demonstrably serious." Id. at 431. The Court held that
the county, not the tribe, had authority to zone the use of land held in fee by non-
Indians within the reservation, but that if tribal interests were imperiled by a use, the
tribe could seek an injunction in district court. Id.
93. "There is no direct conflict between the state and tribal schemes, since each
government is free to impose its taxes without ousting the other." Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 158 (1980). Because
no consumer will purchase from a store where he or she must pay twice the taxes as-
sessed at other stores, the Court realized that concurrent taxation would lessen or even
eliminate tribal commerce with non-members. The Court reasoned, however, that this
commerce came into existence only because of the tribe's claimed exemption from state
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vantage because they had to pay two separate taxes, whereas non-mem-
bers were only subject to the state tax. Although a tribal tax has not
generally prevented the state from imposing its own taxes, this factor
has played a role in individual decisions.
Another factor considered in many of the Court's decisions is the
Court's reluctance to immunize from state taxes those Indians who are
not members of the tribe.94 Subjecting Indians who are not members
of the governing tribe to taxation in no way violates the principle of
tribal self-government.95 Because non-tribal Indians or Indians be-
longing to another tribe have no relation to the governing tribe, they
are, for practical purposes, equivalent to non-Indians who enter reser-
vation land.9 6 Therefore, the Court has permitted states to tax any
person who is not a member of the governing tribe.
A third factor is the Court's dislike of tax schemes that create a
checkerboard pattern across lands subject to and lands exempt from
taxation. The Court, ironically, seeks consistency and attempts to
avoid schemes that would subject some plots of land to taxation while
exempting adjacent lots.97 These three factors have affected the ration-
taxes; therefore, the tribe had no specific right to that commerce. Id. at 157. As re-
cently as 1989, the Court permitted concurrent jurisdiction to tax when the exercise of
both authorities does "not do violence to the rights of either sovereign." Brendale, 492
U.S. at 466 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (finding that the state may im-
pose its own severance tax on minerals despite the tribe's severance tax). But see
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 440 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) (doubting whether there can be
concurrent jurisdiction to regulate land use).
94. Washington, 447 U.S. at 160-61. See generally CANBY, supra note 3, at 207-09
(discussing the Court's attempt to distinguish between members and non-members of a
given reservation). But one commentator argues that this line-drawing is very
awkward:
The Burger Court's exclusion of nonmember Indians who reside on the reservation
... shows a particularly profound misunderstanding of the Indian tribal commu-
nity.... Indian communities usually contain many persons, often full-blood Indi-
ans, who through marriage, or as a result of parentage of different tribes, are
ineligible for formal enrollment as tribal members.
Clinton, supra note 6, at 442. Moreover, some tribe members live off the reservation
and may still escape state tax laws when they visit the reservation.
95. Washington, 447 U.S. at 160-61. Self-government, by definition, involves gov-
ernance only over those members of the governing tribe. Denying a tribe jurisdiction
over Indians affiliated with other tribes or over non-tribal Indians in no way affects the
ability of the tribe to govern its members.
96. Id. at 161.
97. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brendale felt that because fee land was
scattered in a checkerboard pattern throughout the reservation, to deny the tribe the
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ale in many of the Court's opinions. The intertwining of these factors
has created a tangled web of standards with which the Burger Court
has repeatedly struggled.9" Would the Rehnquist Court be able to un-
tangle the web and reach a conclusion as to what standard should ap-
ply to issues regarding the state taxation of Indian reservation land and
activities?
C. Case Law: The Rehnquist Court
In recent years, the Supreme Court has not applied a uniform test in
all cases involving state taxation of Indian land and affairs. The Court
has been narrowing, however, its field of choices. The Court has uti-
lized three different tests, each in separate cases, but all three tests in-
herently influenced each decision.
In 1987, the Court decided California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians.99 In this case, the state of California attempted to impose its
bingo regulations on games run by the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of
Mission Indians on their reservation land."°° The Court held that the
state could not impose its regulations in the absence of explicit congres-
sional authorization.'0 1 The Court was unable to find such authoriza-
tion.10 2 Then, because the state regulation dealt with non-Indians, the
right to zone fee land "would destroy [its] capacity to engage in comprehensive plan-
ning." Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828
F.2d 529, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub non. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). A majority of the Court
agreed. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422-25 (plurality opinion). The dissent argued that the
Court should not make a distinction between "open" and "closed" areas because this
distinction itself would create a checkerboard problem. Id. at 463-64 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court reiterated its dislike of the check-
erboard approach in County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 691
(1992).
98. "In essence there appears to be no rigid rule by which to resolve the issue
whether a particular state law may properly be applied to an Indian reservation or to
members of a tribe." HARTMAN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, at 251 (citing White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)).
99. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
100. Id. at 204-06. This case did not involve a state tax, but rather state regula-
tions. Although general regulations do not always instigate the same issues as the impo-
sition of taxes, the application of the regulations in Cabazon involves similar problems,
so the Court approached the case in roughly the same manner.
101. Id. at 207.
102. The Court found that Pub. L. No. 280, which gave California jurisdiction over
Indian country, did not give the state explicit authorization to impose its bingo regula-
tions. Id. at 212. Section 2 of this law gave the state broad criminal jurisdiction, but
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Court examined whether taxation interfered with federal or tribal in-
terests.10 3 The latter query was akin to the balancing test that the Bur-
ger Court refused to adopt, and that the Rehnquist Court later
repudiated." 4 The Court found that the state's interests were not com-
pelling enough to justify infringing the federal and tribal interests at
stake. 1 05
In 1989 the Court decided Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico. 106
In this case, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe leased reservation land to the
Cotton Petroleum Corporation for the production of oil and gas.1"7
Both the tribe and the state imposed severance taxes on the oil and
gas.108 The Corporation sued the state, claiming that the state was
precluded from imposing its tax on oil and gas severed from reserva-
§ 4's grant of civil jurisdiction was more limited. Section 4 granted jurisdiction over
private civil litigation, but did not grant general civil regulatory authority. Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 385, 388-90 (1976) (holding that Pub. L. No. 280 did not
authorize Minnesota to impose personal property tax on Indian's on-reservation mobile
home). See also Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207-08. The court held that since the bingo
regulations were more "civil/regulatory" than "criminal/prohibitory," they were not
authorized by Pub. L. No. 280. 480 U.S. at 209-10.
103. 480 U.S. at 216. The Court made known that "[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-
empted.., if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in
federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of
state authority." Id. (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
333-34 (1983)). The use of the term "pre-empted" is confusing since preemption analy-
sis is not utilized by the Court. The repeated careless use of the term "pre-empted"
could be responsible for much of the confusion in the Court's decision. The Court likely
meant that it would apply a per se rule prohibiting states from intruding in the absence
of explicit congressional authorization in the "special area of state taxation." See id. at
215 n.17 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)). The
Court applied this second query, however, because taxation was not involved in this
case. It implied that such a test was appropriate even in tax cases involving sales to
non-Indians. Id at 215-16.
104. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text for discussion of the Burger
Court's balancing test. See also County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 U.S.
at 693 (criticizing any balancing test).
105. The Court identified important federal and tribal interests of Indian sover-
eignty, self-government, and encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic develop-
ment. Id. at 216. The Court went on to reject the notion that the tribe was merely
"marketing an exemption from state gambling laws." Id. at 219. It concluded that the
state's interest in preventing organized crime from spreading into tribal bingo games
would not justify allowing the state to impose its regulations. Id. at 220-21.
106. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
107. Id. at 168.
108. Id. at 168-69. The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 permitted tribes to
execute mineral leases. Id. at 167. The Secretary of the Interior approved the tribe's
authority to impose taxes on non-Indian lessees of reservation land. Id. Moreover, the
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tion land." The Court held that the Corporation was subject to non-
discriminatory state taxation unless Congress preempted the state
taxes.11 Finding no federal law preempting the state's taxes, the
Court upheld their application to the Corporation.111
Most recently, in 1992, the Court addressed the case of County of
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation." 2 In this case, Yakima County
sought to apply its ad valorem tax to reservation land owned by the
Yakima Indian Nation or individual members of the tribe and an ex-
cise tax on the sales of such land." 3 When the County attempted to
foreclose on the properties for which the taxes were past due, the tribe
contested the taxes and argued that federal law prohibited them.1 14
The Court determined that the County could not impose its taxes un-
less Congress gave explicit authorization for such taxation. 1 5 The
Court had upheld this tribe's power to impose severance taxes on these leases in Mer-
rion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
109. 490 U.S. at 170. The Corporation argued that the State could not impose its
taxes because it failed to provide services commensurate with the taxes paid. Id. The
tribe, by amicus curiae, argued that the state taxes interfered with tribal sovereignty.
Id. At the New Mexico Court of Appeals, the tribe changed its approach, arguing that
the state's taxes could not withstand preemption analysis. Id. at 172. The tribe con-
ceded that states could regulate the conduct of non-Indians on Indian reservations when
such regulation would not interfere with tribal self-government. Id. It argued, how-
ever, that the state tax interfered with the tribe's ability to raise its own taxes and was
therefore an improper interference with tribal self-government. Id. at 172.
110. Id. at 175-76.
111. Id. at 182-83. The Court recognized that preemption analysis included a con-
cern over tribal sovereignty, stating:
Although determining whether federal legislation has preempted state taxation of
lessees of Indian land is primarily an exercise in examining congressional intent,
the history of tribal sovereignty serves as a necessary "backdrop" to that process
.... As a result, questions of pre-emption in this area are not resolved by reference
to standards of pre-emption that have developed in other areas of the law ....
Each case "requires a particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and
tribal interests."
Id. at 176 (quoting Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mex-
ico, 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982)). Thus, the preemption test incorporates parts of both the
"infringement on sovereignty" test and the balancing test into its analysis.
112. 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992). This was a case of profound importance. Sixteen Indian
tribes, the Bush Administration, and the Native American Rights Fund provided sup-
port for the Yakima Indian Nation, while ten states and counties in four other states
sided with Yakima County. Property Taxes, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 1992, at A5.
113. 112 S. Ct. at 687.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 693. The Court used this same test in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985). In that case, the state tried to impose taxes on the tribe's
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Court found that the ad valorem tax constituted a "taxation of...
land" under the General Allotment Act and was therefore within con-
gressional authorization.116 However, the Court struck down the ap-
plication of the excise tax because it found no authority for such
taxes.
117
In County of Yakima, the Court also used language indicative of a
preemption analysis1 8 This demonstrates why the Court's opinions
have generated so much confusion. The problem is the use of the term
"preemption." First, preemption analysis for determining whether a
state may impose taxes on Indians is qualitatively different from pre-
emption analysis in other fields of law. 19 In this context, the preemp-
tion test includes possible preemption not only by federal legislation,
but also preemption by federal policies or interests. 120 Second, the
Court uses the term "preemption" to refer to a test which proscribes
any state taxes unless expressly authorized by Congress.121 This is not
a preemption test. Under the test utilized in County of Yakima, all
state taxes are presumptively invalid.1 22 Only if Congress expressly an-
royalty interests from mineral leases. Id. at 761. The Court required explicit congres-
sional authorization before it would permit imposition of the tax. Id. at 765. Finding
no such authorization, the Court forbade Montana from applying its taxes to the Indi-
ans. Id. at 766-68.
116. 112 S. Ct. at 692-93. But as Justice Blackmun points out in dissent, the ex-
plicit congressional authorization that the Court relied on was meant to apply only to
land patented prematurely. Id. at 694. The Court relied upon language in a proviso
added to the Indian General Allotment Act by the Burke Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 149,
34 Stat. 182, Ch. 2348 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)). Id. at 695. Blackmun
argued that "by its terms, the proviso does not remove 'restrictions as to ... taxation'
from all allotted land. It removes restrictions solely from allotted land that happened to
be patented in fee 'prematurely,'.. ." Id. Although the Court could interpret this to
mean Congress intended all land to be subject to taxation, Blackmun stated that this
interpretation of intent was far from "unmistakably clear." Id. Because Congress' in-
tent was not clear in this matter, Justice Blackmun would have prohibited the ad
valorem tax. Id. at 694. See also infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text analyzing
the General Allotment Act and the Burke Act.
117. Id. at 693-94.
118. See id. at 693.
119. See supra note III for a quotation from the Court acknowledging the distinc-
tiveness of applying preemption analysis to Indian taxation.
120. Accord English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
121. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 693
(1992); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764-66 (1985); McClana-
han v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973).
122. See supra note 115 and accompanying text for the test used in County of
Yakima.
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thorizes taxation will the state be able to impose its tax. Under tradi-
tional preemption analysis, in contrast, all state taxes are
presumptively legitimate. A state may impose any nondiscriminatory
tax unless Congress has expressly prohibited such taxes or such a tax
violates important federal policies or interests.12 These two tests rest
on antithetical presumptions, and the Court's use of the term "preemp-
tion" for both has caused much confusion and inconsistency in this
field of law.
Accordingly, the Rehnquist Court has alternated between two com-
pletely diametric tests, despite labelling both preemption analysis. Be-
cause neither the states nor the tribes know which test the Court will
apply in a given situation, they cannot model their conduct around any
specific standard. This type of ad hoc reasoning not only increases liti-
gation, it also promulgates uncertainty in the law. In order to restore
predictability and the integrity of the law, the Court must decide on a
standard that can be consistently applied to all situations in which a
state attempts to impose a tax on Indian reservation land or activities.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY ARGUMENTS
A. Congressional Responses
The Court stated that a standard for resolving when states may im-
pose taxes on Indian reservation land and activities should come from
Congress. 24 Indeed, since the beginning of this century, the Court has
looked to Congress to establish such a standard.'25 If Congress did
act, it would surely enjoy much deference by the Courts.126 But Con-
123. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 738-39 (1983).
124. One commentator interprets cases such as Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1973), and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S.
342, 365-366 (1949), as arguing that "the whole ball of wax of tax immunity regarding
Indian lands and affairs should properly be controlled by Congress." HARTMAN, supra
note 40, § 6:10.
125. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 445 (1903) (answering argument
that Indians have privileges of citizenship and should therefore be taxed by stating that
it is the core of the legislative branch to say where Indians should shoulder that
burden).
126. Most Court decisions struggle to find congressional intent and will defer to this
intent even when not explicitly stated. As one author noted:
Congressional power to exempt land from state taxation is limited only by the
requirement that the property or function in question be reasonably considered
incident to a federal function. So large is the discretion permitted the legislature by
the courts in this connection that no case has been found in which the court refused
to sustain Congress' power to exempt.
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gress has been vague at best in providing guidance on this issue. Our
current national policy, as indicated by the legislative and executive
branches, is to accept the independent status of the Indian tribes and
help foster their independence and development.127
During the last half of the nineteenth century, the federal govern-
ment favored a policy of isolating tribes on reservations.1 28 However,
late in the nineteenth century, this policy gave way to a policy of allot-
ting lands to individual Indians.129 Congress, at that time, believed
that the proper approach was to assimilate the Indians into civilized
society and take away their autonomy.130 This policy of allotting res-
ervation land to individual tribe members on a tribe by tribe basis
failed because the Indians could sell their land to non-Indians in un-
wise or fraudulent transactions.1
31
Congress responded to this problem by enacting the Indian General
Allotment Act of 1887 (also known as the Dawes Act).132 The Act
allowed the President to allot tribal lands to individual Indians without
the tribe's consent.133 According to this Act, every parcel of land that
was allotted to an Indian would be held in trust for at least twenty-five
years.1 34 The Act granted states civil and criminal jurisdiction upon
issuance of a patent in fee at the expiration of the trust period. 135 Ad-
COHEN, supra note 3, at 255.
127. See Canby, supra note 11, at 1 ("[O]ur national Indian policy... assumes the
permanence of the Indian tribes as self-governing entities, and encourages tribal auton-
omy and development."). See also supra note 2 for a listing of federal statutes and
noting the underlying policy toward Indians.
128. CANBY, supra note 3, at 17-19 (addressing the national policy toward Indians
from 1850 to 1887).
129. See County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 686 (1992)
(noting that the objective of the allotment policy was to "extinguish tribal sovereignty,




132. Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current ver-
sion at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
133. Id. § 331.
134. Id. § 348. A proviso permits the President to extend the period of the trust.
Id. The Act was "designed ultimately to abolish Indian reservations while attempting
to bring security and civilization to the Indian." Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 436 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. The statute reads in pertinent part: "At the expiration of the trust period and
[upon conveyance]. ... each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to
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ditionally, the Burke Act136 added a proviso that permitted the Secre-
tary of the Interior to issue a patent in fee before the expiration of the
trust.1 37 Such premature patenting would release the land of any re-
strictions as to taxation.1 38 The Supreme Court recently held that both
section 6 of the Dawes Act and the Burke Act proviso express Con-
gress' intent to subject allotted lands to state taxation. 139
By 1934, Congress rethought its position on the allotment policy.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 1 ° prohibited further allot-
ments1 4' and extended already existing trusts indefinitely.142 This Act
did not, however, repeal the Dawes Act or the Burke Act.143 Con-
gress, thus, returned to the policy of recognizing Indian autonomy,
and, instead of trying to assimilate the Indians into civilized society,
attempted to foster development and autonomy within the Indian
the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside
.. " 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988).
136. Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)).
See infra note 137 for the exact language of the proviso.
137. The proviso reads:
Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is au-
thorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent and
capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such
allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance
[sic], or taxation of said land shall be removed and said land shall not be liable to
the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuing of such patent.
25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988). The Court has struggled over whether this provision subjects
an allotment to taxation whenever a fee simple is issued or only when a fee is issued
prematurely. Compare the opinions of Justices Scalia and Blackmun in County of
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 691, 694 (1992).
138. Upon premature patenting, "all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance [sic], or
taxation of said land shall be removed .... ." 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988).
139. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 691. Of course, these provisions only granted
in rem jurisdiction. Therefore, the state could only impose taxes on the land. Id. As
the Court pointed out in County of Yakima, in rem jurisdiction does not disrupt the
tribe's ability to govern themselves. Id. at 692.
140. Pub. L. No. 73-383,48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
141. "On and after June 18, 1934, no land of any Indian reservation... shall be
allotted in severalty to any Indian." 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
142. "The existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands and any restriction
on alienation thereof are extended and continued until otherwise directed by Congress."
25 U.S.C. § 462 (1988).
143. See County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 690-91 (1992)
(rejecting any repeal by implication).
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tribes. 144
There has never been a set policy regarding state taxation of Indian
reservation land and activities. Arguably, Congress has addressed the
issue, but the Courts have refused to recognize these provisions as ex-
pressions of congressional intent. In the Buck Act 145 Congress granted
states the authority to impose certain taxes within prescribed federal
areas. But the courts have interpreted this Act as not applying to In-
dian reservations.'46
Before enacting the Wheeler-Howard Act, 4 7 Congress removed two
tax immunity provisions from the final version of the bill. 14 ' The
Supreme Court did not interpret this as congressional intent to subject
Indians to state taxes.149 Furthermore, in 1948150 Congress arguably
expressed its intent that non-Indian owned fee land on reservation
property should be included in "Indian country" for purposes of juris-
diction.151 The Court, however, apparently did not consider this provi-
144. See supra note 127 and accompanying text describing our current national In-
dian policy.
145. Buck Act of 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 644 (codified at 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110
(1988)).
146. See, eg., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691
n.18 (1965); Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espanola, 361 P.2d 950, 955-56 (1961).
Cf. 4 U.S.C. § 109 (1988) (stating that the Act does not reach taxes on Indians).
147. Pub. L. No. 73-383,48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)). The Wheeler-Howard Act is another name for the Indian
Reorganization Act.
148. The predecessor bills of the Wheeler-Howard Act, H.R. 7902, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934) and S. 2755, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), contained provisions such as
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as rendering the property of any Indian com-
munity.., subject to taxation by any State or subdivision thereof .... Hearings on
H.R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934)
(statements of Mr. John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs), and "[a]s a federal
agency, the property of a chartered community is constitutionally exempt from State
taxation .. " Id. at 25. See also Mesalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152-
53 n.9 (1972) (explaining the legislative history).
149. The Court apparently did not think that Congress' discussions on exempting
certain Indian tribes from the Wheeler-Howard Act indicated that Congress generally
intended Indians to be subject to the Act. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1926, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1938); PUBLISHED HEARING, H891-1, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
150. Pub. L. No. 722, 62 Stat. 757 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1988)).
151. Section 1151 reads: "Except as otherwise provided .. . the term "Indian
Country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of a patent .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). See also Clinton, supra note 6,
at 443 (noting that this provision suggested the congressional judgment "to include non-
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sion an adequate expression of congressional intent. Indeed, in several
decisions the Court reached results directly contrary to the
provision. 152
In Public Law 280153 Congress gave states the option of assuming
jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over Indian reservations within a
state.15 4 Section 2 of the law granted broad criminal jurisdiction, but
the Supreme Court held that section 4's grant of civil jurisdiction did
not include a grant of power to tax reservation Indians.1 55 The Court
found that section 4 granted jurisdiction over private civil litigation,
but did not grant to the states general civil authority to regulate the
activities of reservation Indians.'15 Thus, Congress has provided sev-
eral opportunities from which the Court could find congressional in-
tent on the issue of state taxation of reservation land. But until
Congress states this intent explicitly, the Court will not give any weight
to these provisions.
Within the past twenty years, Congress has passed Acts describing
the national policy toward Indian tribes.'5 7 In the Indian Financing
Act of 1974,158 Congress established a system of providing capital for
Indian owned fee land located within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation
within the definition of Indian country for jurisdictional purposes").
152. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that tribes
generally do not have inherent tribal authority and that states may therefore exercise
jurisdiction over nonmember activities on fee land held by non-Indians within the
reservation).
153. 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1360-62 (1988)).
154. As originally enacted in 1953, states could assume jurisdiction over the tribe
without the tribe's consent. The Indian Civil Rights Act amended this provision in
1968 to require the consent of the tribe before the state could assume jurisdiction over
the reservation. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
155. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379-93 (1976).
156. Id. at 383-87 (noting that the legislative history of § 4 cannot be read to extend
general state civil regulatory authority). See also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen
Band of the Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 905 (1991); Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
157. See supra note 127 and accompanying text describing our national Indian pol-
icy. Indeed, Congress, late in 1991, designated the year of 1992 as the "Year of the
American Indian." 138 CONG. REC. E1519 (daily ed. May 26, 1992) (statement of
Hon. Faleomavaega) (noting the enactment of Public Law 102-188 which designates
1992 to the first inhabitants); 137 CONG. Rac. H10,988 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1991) (state-
ment of Rep. Sawyer) (reading Senate Joint Resolution 217 and passing it as a procla-
mation that 1992 is the Year of the American Indian).
158. Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1544 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
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the development and utilization of resources on reservation land. This
system was designed to promote Indian self-management, while better-
ing their standard of living.1 59 In the 1988 Amendments to the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act,"6 in addition to
providing assistance to the tribes' educational systems, Congress made
a broad statement of congressional policy.1 61 Neither of these acts,
however, gave explicit recognition of congressional intent regarding
state taxation of reservation land. 162
159. The 1984 Amendments to the Indian Financing Act did not change its basic
policy. The Congressional declaration of policy reads:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to provide capital on a reimburs-
able basis to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human,
to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and
management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living
from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in
neighboring communities.
25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988).
160. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, § 101, 102 Stat. 2285 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 450
(1988)).
161. Congress added § 450a in the 1988 amendments. This section included a
lengthy statement on Congress' policy regarding the Indian tribes:
(a) Recognition of obligation of United States.
The Congress hereby recognizes the obligation of the United States to respond to
the strong expression of the Indian people for self-determination by assuring maxi-
mum Indian participation in the direction of educational as well as other Federal
services to Indian communities so as to render such services more responsive to the
needs and desires of those communities.
(b) Declaration of commitment.
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Gov-
ernment's unique and continuing relationship with, and responsibility to, individ-
ual Indian tribes and to the Indian people as a whole through the establishment of
a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly transi-
tion from the Federal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians to effec-
tive and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct,
and administration of those programs and services. In accordance with this policy,
the United States is committed to supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the
development of strong and stable tribal governments, capable of administering
quality programs and developing the economies of their respective communities.
25 U.S.C. § 450a (1988).
162. Several decisions have interpreted congressional policy as not allowing state
taxation of reservation land. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of the
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 111 S. Ct. 905, 910 (1991) (holding that a state
which has not asserted jurisdiction under Pub. L. No. 280 may not tax sales to tribe
members, but may tax sales to nonmembers); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)
(holding that a state court has no jurisdiction to entertain suits against Indians). Other
decisions have interpreted congressional policy to avoid a "checkerboard" approach.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol44/iss1/4
STATE TAX ON INDIANS
Congress has never specifically addressed the problem of state taxa-
tion of Indian reservation land and activities. The legislature is most
likely the proper forum for resolving this issue. But because Congress
has not manifested any intent as to how to address the issue, the courts
have struggled to find congressional intent in laws that only tangen-
tially refer to the problem. The Rehnquist Court has oscillated be-
tween three separate tests,163 each requiring a determination of
Congress' intent. These tests, however, are doomed to a life of specula-
tion, inconsistency, and disharmony unless Congress explicitly
manifests its true intentions.
B. Problems with Taxing Indians
Imposing state taxes on Indian tribes creates several policy
problems. One problem is that taxes on reservation land or activities
are inconsistent with the concept of tribal sovereignty.' States never
owned the land that they seek to tax. Moreover, a sovereign cannot
govern itself and bolster the economy of its community when it must
pay taxes to another sovereign. Granted tribes are not states, but they
do possess a measure of sovereignty.165 Furthermore, federal policy
encourages tribal self-government and maintenance of the tribe's own
economy.1 66 State taxation seems directly at odds with this federal
policy.
Additional problems are created because Indian economies are de-
pendent on tax exemptions. On-reservation market participants inevi-
tably suffer because of inconvenient locations. Indian shops must
convince potential customers to travel a greater distance than neces-
sary in order to patronize tribal shops. Traditionally, Indians have
been able to do this because of state tax exemptions. Indian shops
See, e-g., Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
425 U.S. 463, 479 (1976) (holding various taxes on sales to tribal members invalid).
163. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text for a summary of the tests used
by the Rehnquist Court.
164. This policy argument is based on the theory of immunity from intergovern-
mental taxation. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text describing the infringe-
ment on sovereignty test.
165. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text for the Court's findings on In-
dian sovereignty.
166. See supra notes 159, 161 quoting congressional policy. Some courts argue that
the more active a role the tribe plays in a given activity, the more significant its interest
in keeping that activity free from state regulation. See Gila River Indian Community v.
Waddell, 967 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1992).
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could provide patrons with a discount because they were immune from
state taxation. Subjecting tribes to taxation would remove the incen-
tive for consumers to travel to a reservation to do their business.167
Imposing state taxes is directly contrary to the federal policy of foster-
ing Indian development and raising their standard of living.168 Indians
are some of the poorest people in the nation.1 69 They need protection,
not taxes.
Furthermore, subjecting Indians to state taxes places them at an eco-
nomic disadvantage. Indian retailers are required to pay both tribal
and state taxes. With this burden, it is virtually impossible for Indian
entrepreneurs to lure customers to the reservation to conduct their
business.' 70 Faced with this dilemma, many Indians have defied the
imposition of taxes on sales to non-Indians.171 Tax evasion is another
167. The Supreme Court has recognized the tribes' reliance on tax exemptions. One
opinion noted that:
Indian tobacco dealers make a large majority of their sales to non-Indians-resi-
dents of nearby communities who journey to the reservation especially to take ad-
vantage of the claimed tribal exemption from the state cigarette and sales taxes
.... The Indian retailer's business is to a substantial degree dependent upon his
tax-exempt status, and if he loses that status his sales will fall off sharply.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
145 (1980). However, the Court also recognized that the tribe would not have had the
business in the first place but for the claimed tax exemption. The Court found that the
state tax did not burden commerce that would exist without respect to the tax exemp-
tion. Id. at 157.
168. See supra notes 159, 161 for statements of federal policy.
169. HARTMAN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, at 240 n.3.
The Litany of social problems on many reservations is depressingly familiar ....
The unemployment rate on reservations is typically in the range of 40 to 50 percent
and on some of the poorer reservations reaches 80 to 90 percent. The lack of jobs
and economic opportunity on reservations is a major contributor to the high levels
of alcoholism, high suicide rates, sense of helplessness and other deep social
problems that afflict all too many tribes. The conditions on reservations more
closely resemble a third world undeveloped nation than the mainstream economy
and society of the United States.
138 CONG. REC. S2192, S2198 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1992) (statement of Sen. McCain).
170. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 170-72 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Com-
mercial growth ... can be had only at the expense of tax dollars."). Congress is aware
of the problem of "double taxation." See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. S2198, S2200 (daily ed.
Feb. 25, 1992) (inserting into record the statement of Peterson Zah, President of the
Navajo Nation) (arguing that "double taxation interferes with [Indians'] ability to en-
courage economic activity and to develop effective revenue generating tax programs").
171. Indians Defy Court on Collecting Taxes, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1991, at B6. In
addition to the threat of financial ruin, some Indians defy the tax on sales to non-Indi-
ans because they do not want to have to ask all customers about their heritage. Id.
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consequence that state taxation engenders.17 2 This problem is espe-
cially acute because of the Supreme Court's recent holding that states
may not sue tribes to enforce taxes.1 73 The foregoing examples demon-
strate the many ill consequences that result when Indians are subjected
to state taxation.
C. Problems with not Taxing Indians
Just as problems arise when states are permitted to tax Indian reser-
vation land and activities, problems exist when Indians are exempt
from taxation. Recently, Indians have been exploiting their tax-exempt
status. Indians have experimented with new entrepreneurial ventures
and have been successful, primarily because on-reservation sites are
tax-free. 74 Indians have especially taken advantage of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988,175 which identifies the right of tribes
to operate any gambling facilities otherwise permitted by state law.1 76
172. Id.
173. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of the Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 111 S. Ct. 905, 912 (1991). States may require Indians to collect state taxes
because this represents a minimal burden. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976). See also Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980). But
states cannot sue in court to enforce the tax. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 11 S. Ct. at 912.
States may, however, seize goods before they reach the Indian shop in order to enforce
tax collection. Washington, 447 U.S. at 161.
174. See Rich Weizel, State Fights Indians Over Planned Casino at Ledyard Reser-
vation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991, at I. See also J. Richard Shaner, New York market-
ers decry Indian 'misuse' of sales tax privilege, NAT'L PETROLEUM NEws, Vol. 84, No.
5, May, 1992, at 16.
175. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
176. Id. § 2701(5). For example, the Mashantucket Pequot Indians are building a
S48.5 million, unlimited stakes casino at their Ledyard, Connecticut reservation. Rich
Weizel, State Fights Indians over Planned Casino at Ledyard Reservation, N.Y. TIMES,
March 24, 1991, at 1. States will suffer economically because they cannot tax this mass
operation. Furthermore, gambling operations located off-reservation are subject to
taxes and can therefore offer less winnings. Patrons will likely stop visiting taxable
casinos in favor of the Indian operations. Wayne King, Atlantic City Shivers at Indians'
Casinos to Come, N.Y. TIMEs, May 26, 1991, at B4. The state challenged the legality of
this undertaking, but the Supreme Court recently denied review. Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1620 (1991).
At least 16 tribes in other states have begun negotiations with state officials for similar
gambling operations. King, supra, at B4. According to one report, "fa]bout 150 tribes
offer bingo games and another 23 offer casino-style operations, bringing in estimated
revenues of $750 million to $1.3 billion." Ellen Gamerman, Indian Gaming Sparks
Debate Between Senate Panel and Federal Agency, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 5,
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Because these operations are located on Indian lands, they are free
from state and local taxation, as well as federal taxes on profits. 177
Moreover, Indian tribes may lease reservation property to non-In-
dian businesspersons, and these lessees are also exempt from taxation.
Retailers can gain an enormous advantage by operating on reservation
land.17' Reservations have thus become extremely attractive commer-
cial sites. This is true especially because, in addition to the tax-exempt
status, there is usually much public opposition to new commercial
projects in cities. 179 Reservation property is leased for such varied uses
as shopping centers, industrial parks, airports, golf courses, indoor ro-
deo arenas, movie stage sets, a proposed power plant, and even a pro-
posed stadium for the Phoenix Cardinals football team.' ° Such tax
exemptions for businesses located on Indian reservations have created
hostility between Indians and non-Indians in some areas.' 8 ' Non-Indi-
1992. One tribe has even proposed a televised high-stakes bingo game in which viewers
could play at home. Cass Peterson, A $50 Million Gamble with Many Reservations.
Officials Question Plan to Benefit Indians, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1987, at A25.
Additionally, California has experienced a sudden rise in the number of betting out-
lets on reservation property. Melvin Durslag, More Betting is Just Around the Corner,
L.A. TIMEs, May 6, 1991, at C3. But see Weizel, supra, at 1 (noting that Indians argue
that the proliferation of Indian-run casinos could actually help a state's economy, for
Indian casinos could "lift the state's sagging economy, creating hundreds of jobs and
stimulating the tourism industry").
177. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703 (1988 and Supp. 111990) (defining the classes of gaming
allowed on Indian lands). Furthermore, some argue that American Indian casinos and
gambling operations are very susceptible to infiltration by organized crime. See, e.g.,
Ellen Gamerman, supra note 176.
178. Steve Dwyer, Kansas Marketers face taxing ordeal with Indian reservation,
NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS, Feb. 1991, Vol. 83, No. 2, at 17.
179. John Edwards, Reservations Lure Commercial Deals, ARIz. Bus. GAZETrE,
Aug. 2, 1990, at 1.
180. Id.; Firm and Indian tribe plan 2,000-Mw plant, ENGINEERING NEws-REc-
ORD, Vol. 229, No. 6, Aug. 10, 1992, at 19.
Not only do the city and state lose tax revenues, but the Indians, faced with immedi-
ate economic gratification, are destroying their land. Their land has historically been of
vital importance to Indian tribes. Whether the federal government should allow Indi-
ans to volunteer their land for commercial development is another difficult issue raised
by the tribe's tax-exempt status.
181. Gasoline Retailers Protest Over Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1992, at B4; Es-
telle Lander & John McDonald, Tax-Exempt Cigarettes Draw Fire, NEWSDAY, Dec. 20,
1991, at 3. The recent clashes concerning taxes on Indians of the Allegheny and Catta-
raugus reservations in New York illuminate the extent of violence which is not only
possible, but perhaps inevitable. See, e.g., Rebelling against taxes, Indians block high-
way, clash with police, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 18, 1992; Stay Allows Indians to
Avoid Sales Taxes, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 1992, at 2; Liz Willen, Tense calm settles over
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ans have threatened violence, but Indians do not want to negotiate
since they enjoy the upper hand.18 2 Because of the Indians' exploita-
tion of their tax-exempt status, public interest has heightened in recent
years. 183
States have historically protested Indian exemptions from state taxa-
tion because the state feels it is denied a source of revenue. This ration-
ale is of particular importance today, because Indian operations have
profoundly increased in both number and size.1 8 4 The state's ability to
impose even a few taxes could be a big revenue source. 18
5
Furthermore, in today's society, American Indians are citizens of the
United States.18 6 They can vote, sue in state courts, and receive some
state services.' 8 7 They can also hold elective and appointed offices at
either the state or local level."8 8 With Indians receiving all these bene-
fits from the state, it seems only fair to subject them to the same obliga-
tions as citizens of the state. Treating Indians differently does not
violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,8 9 but it is inequitable
reservation; Police leave Indian town after clashes, HOUSTON CHRON., July 19, 1992, at
A2.
182. Lander & McDonald, supra note 181, at 3.
183. Executive and legislative sympathy, however, remains with the Indians. Cur-
rent policy seems to encourage such use of reservation land. A task force of departmen-
tal professionals and officials from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, convened in 1985 by
the Secretary of the Interior, recommended that Congress enact legislation to create
"enterprise zones" on Indian reservations. The task force also proposed tax incentives
for these zones. 138 CONG. REc. S2198-99 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1992) (statement of Sen.
McCain). Congress, at the time of this publication, is considering such legislation. See,
e.g., Steve Gerstel, Senate Approves $35 billion tax bill, UPI, Sept. 29, 1992; Chet Lun-
ner, Senators Want Reservations Included in Urban Reform, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE,
May 14, 1992. Likewise, the proposed Indian Employment and Investment Act of 1992
provides for tax credits to Indians. H.R. 5468, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
184. See supra notes 174-180 and accompanying text noting the expansion of Indian
businesses and gambling facilities.
185. Susan Craig, More Tax Revenues Likely After Supreme Court Ruling, PUBLIC
FINANCE/WASH. WATCH, Mar. 11, 1991, at 4.
186. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1988) (providing that those persons "born in the United
States to a member of an Indian tribe" shall become a U.S. citizen at birth).
187. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973).
188. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
425 U.S. 463, 467 (1976).
189. The Court rejected claims that special treatment for Indians discriminated
against non-Indians in violation of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause
in Moe, 425 U.S. at 479-80 (1976), and Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-55
(1974). In each case, the Court reasoned that all Indian laws single out Indians for
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to have one group of people enjoy the benefits of state government, yet
be free from participation in the maintenance of that government.
Thus, several dilemmas develop when Indians are immunized from
state taxation.
IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD
The Court has articulated many tests for solving the question of state
taxation of Indian reservation land and activities.1"' All these tests
have their benefits and their problems. Several states have offered their
own solutions,1 91 but none of these proposals are superior to a test that
is espoused by three Justices. 92 Still, an analysis of the advantages
and disadvantages of these state-proposed plans is helpful in under-
standing how the various interests at stake interact.
Oklahoma suggested that tribal sovereignty be given more limited
protection. 93 Specifically, Oklahoma suggested that only the tribal
courts and the internal affairs of tribal government be protected by the
doctrine of tribal sovereignty. 94 Oklahoma believed that insulating
Indian businesses from suits to collect taxes did not further tribal sov-
ereignty.1 95 But this approach ignores the fact that the nation's policy
is to improve the living conditions and promote the development of the
Indian community. Oklahoma's proposal would seriously disadvan-
tage Indian businesses by subjecting them to both state and tribal taxes.
Oklahoma's approach does little to protect the tribes' interests. The
Supreme Court addressed these arguments and rejected Oklahoma's
special treatment. If the Court deemed all these laws violations of due process and
equal protection an entire title of the United States Code would be invalidated. As long
as Congress bases its Indian laws on its unique obligations to the Indians, these laws will
not violate the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. Morton, supra, at
552-55.
190. See supra section II of this Note.
191. Oklahoma, Nevada, and New York have all proposed standards. Only
Oklahoma's proposal has been considered by the Supreme Court. See infra notes 193-
203 and accompanying text for a description of each of these state proposals.
192. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall recommended their own approach
in their dissents in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 193-211
(1989), and Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 735-44 (1983). See infra notes 204-213 for
analysis on their approach.
193. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of the Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
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Nevada has proposed an alternative approach, in which tribes could
remain exempt from state taxes provided that they charge taxes at the
same rate as the state.19 7 This would eliminate any disparity between
tribal prices and off-reservation prices, yet the tribe would be able to
keep the revenue.198 The benefits of this plan are that tribal businesses
do not have to pay double taxes and the distinction between Indian and
non-Indian purchasers would be eliminated. Furthermore, less expen-
sive prices on reservation sites would not disadvantage non-Indian
businesses. However, consumers would no longer have any incentive
to travel to the reservation to conduct their business. Reservation
shops would therefore be unable to compete with the more convenient
off-reservation sites. The tribes have not responded favorably to this
policy. Only two of the twenty-five tribes in the state have imposed
their own taxes pursuant to this regulation.'99 The Supreme Court has
not had the opportunity to address this specific proposal.
New York has argued for a hybrid of the Nevada approach.2 "o
Under New York's standard, Indians could remain immune from state
taxes so long as the tribe charged taxes at a specified percentage of the
state rate. Under the specific plan proposed by New York, the tribe
would be required to collect taxes on cigarettes, gasoline, and diesel
fuel at a rate of nine cents less than the state tax per unit.20 1 This
standard is a compromise, giving tribal shops a small price break in
order to lure consumers to the reservation, yet respecting non-Indian
196. Id. at 910. Another idea involves providing funds for Indians who desire to
start a business off the reservation. After granting initial funds to get the business
started, the state could then impose taxes on the business at an equal rate as non-Indian
businesses. This system would promote economic development while assimilating the
Indian culture into "civilized" society. This system, however, runs counter to the cur-
rent federal Indian policy of promoting Indian autonomy rather than assimilating the
Indians into mainstream society. To the knowledge of this author, no court or com-
mentator has considered this proposition.
197. DAiLY REP. FOR EXEC. (BNA), Apr. 19, 1991, at H-2. The Nevada proposal
provides that the governing body of the reservation must enact an ordinance to impose
an excise tax that is equal to or greater than that excised by the state. Id. They must
submit a copy of that ordinance to the Nevada Tax Department in order to avoid hav-
ing the department collect the tax. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 197-99 for a summary of the Nevada proposal.
201. Jeannie H. Cross, New York goes to war with Indians over Taxes, UPI, Mar. 7,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
132 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 44:99
businesses because many consumers will not make the extra trip to save
such a small amount. This proposal may sound appealing, but it is
very legislative in character.2 "2 Additionally, line-drawing for this
standard is necessarily very arbitrary. Moreover, the Nevada and New
York tests would be applicable only to sales taxes. A different standard
would be necessary for income taxes, ad valorem taxes, excise taxes,
use taxes, and the like.203 A system that provided different standards
for different taxes would be very complex, especially because some
taxes are not easily categorized. The Court should strive to find one
standard that applies to all state taxes imposed on Indian reservation
land and activities.
Despite these state proposals, the best choice for a standard is one
advocated by three Justices. 2" The "modernized" preemption analysis
used by the dissent in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico 205 and
Rice v. Rehner206 is most consistent with all the interests involved.
Under this standard, the state may tax Indian reservation land and
activities unless that tax is preempted by (1) federal law, or (2) federal
policies.2"7 Federal policy requires consideration of state, tribal, and
202. Courts decide concrete controversies. The judicial function does not include
setting strict standards that necessarily involve political, economic and sociological de-
terminations. Ascertaining what percentage of state tax rates must be applied by Indian
tribes involves decisions on how much assistance the tribes should receive, how much of
a tax difference is necessary to maintain tribal economies, and how much of a tax differ-
ence would lure a specified percentage of potential customers to the reservation to con-
duct their business. This sort of decision-making is vested in the legislature, not the
judiciary.
203. This test, of course, could be applied to other taxes; but the state has no inter-
est in whether the tribe imposes an ad valorem tax on tribal property. Furthermore,
application of this test to all taxes would deny the state this entire source of revenue.
This test would not allow any state taxes of any kind as long as the tribe taxed at the
specified rate. Apart from the invitation of fraud, such as the tribe purporting to tax its
members and then returning their money, recent Court decisions demonstrate the pol-
icy of permitting the states to impose some taxes. See, e.g., Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 692-94 (1992) (invali-
dating county's excise tax on sales of fee patented lands held by tribe members but
upholding an ad valorem tax).
204. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall suggested this method in their dis-
senting opinions in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 193-211
(1989), and Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 735-44 (1983).
205. 490 U.S. 163 (1989). This test is loosely based on Marshall's two-part test
from White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). See supra notes
86-88 and accompanying text for Marshall's test in Bracker.
206. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
207. 490 U.S. at 193 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun says that the court must
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federal interests.2 °8
The modernized preemtion test best protects all the interests in-
volved.2 o The state interests at stake include (1) protecting major
sources of revenue, (2) protecting their citizens' businesses against un-
fair competition, and (3) even-handed enforcement of their tax laws.
This test is consistent with state interests because the state's taxes are
presumptively valid. Moreover, the tribe cannot claim that the tax is
preempted unless it significantly infringes the tribe's ability to govern
itself, thus ensuring that the state's citizens will not be run out of busi-
ness.210 The tribal interests at stake include protection of its members'
businesses and unhampered governance over tribal members and busi-
nesses. 2 1 1 The test protects these interests by preempting any tax that
would interfere with the tribe's self-government.21 2 Likewise, the test
recognizes federal policies, such as maintaining the autonomy of the
tribes and promoting tribal development. Recognition of these policies
serves both tribal and federal interests. Furthermore, this standard is
consistent with the Court's direction, albeit circuitous, in recent
years.213 In addition, it allows for Congress to interpose new policies
and regulations as the needs of the tribes and the various levels of gov-
ernment change.214 This "modernized" preemption analysis provides
first "look to the statutory scheme Congress has established to govern the activity the
state seeks to tax in order to see whether the statute itself expresses Congress' views on
the question of state taxation." Id. The Court must then consider federal policy. Id.
See also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 739 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting
that certain areas have been preempted "because federal policy favors leaving Indians
free from state control, and because Federal Law is sufficiently comprehensive to bar
the states' exercise of authority").
208. 490 U.S. at 204-10.
209. This is a "true" preemption test. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying
text discussing the inconsistent use of the term "preemption.".
210. Minor detriments to tribal economy or governing practices should not prevent
imposition of the tax. Accord Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d
1253 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that a state possessory interest tax as applied to lessees of
Indian land has only a trivial impact on the tribe and thus was properly imposed), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); Aqua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riv-
erside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971) (same), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).
211. 490 U.S. at 209-11.
212. See supra note 209 and accompany text listing tribal interests.
213. As noted in section II-C of this Note, the Rehnquist Court has oscillated be-
tween two antithetical tests, while labelling each a preemption analysis. Apparently,
preemption analysis is the preferred test, but the Court has simply misapplied it.
214. The canon of construction holding that ambiguous provisions are to be re-
solved in favor of the Indians can still thrive. See supra text accompanying note 66 for
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the most protection for all interests involved.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's approach to the issue of state taxation of In-
dian reservation land and activities has been amazingly inconsistent.
This inconsistency has generated uncertainty in the law, hostility to-
ward Indians, and increased litigation. Yet, Congress has provided lit-
tle help on this divisive issue.21 This matter is in need of a standard
form of analysis that can be applied to all state taxes imposed on reser-
vation land and activities. The "modernized" preemption analysis uti-
lized by Justice Blackmun in his dissents in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico2 16 and Rice v. Rehner217 offers the most protection to
state, tribal, and federal interests and is most consistent with current
federal policy.
Any standard, however, would be better than no standard. Once a
standard is imposed, litigation will decrease, hostility toward the
American Indians will subside, and the law will become more clear.
The Supreme Court should strive to achieve these goals. The Court
should, once and for all, come to a conclusion as to the proper stan-
dard to be implemented in all cases involving the question of whether a
state has jurisdiction to tax Indian reservation land and activities.
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this canon. Indeed, some canon of construction is necessary until Congress explicitly
states its intent regarding certain taxes.
215. See supra Section III-A of this Note analyzing Congress' response.
216. 490 U.S. 163, 193-211 (1989).
217. 463 U.S. 713, 735-44 (1983).
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